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RECENT CASES
ment that allegations be made of substantial error such that an appeal
would have been of some benefit. The decision relied on Tipton v.
Commonwealth," a pre-Hammershoy case which said that failure of
appointed counsel to perfect an appeal could not be reached under
RCr 11.42, but "could under appropriate circumstances, become the
basis for an appeal which otherwise would have been foreclosed as
too late."' 2
The procedural confusion attending these cases could be dispelled
by the approach mentioned in Tipton. If the time for appeal has run
while an indigent is relying on appointed counsel to bring an appeal,
and counsel did not bring an appeal because he felt it was without
merit, then allow a late appeal to be made. The indigent could peti-
tion the sentencing court for a record and appointed counsel; if the
court refused to grant them because time had run, he could seek
mandamus from the Court of Appeals to force the trial court to grant
him such assistance. Then, or after perfection of the appeal, if the
Commonwealth argues that time for appeal has run, he could claim
special facts justifying the late appeal. This would be more direct and
sensible than the present, uncertain back-door approach to obtaining
an extension of time in which to appeal.
Laura L. Murrell
CONSTrT~rIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-CIIxnqAL
PROSECUrIoN OF A CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC FOR PuiUc DRuNKENEss.-Joe
B. Driver, 59, was arrested and sentenced for public drunkenness.
Driver's first conviction for public intoxication occurred at the age of
twenty-four, and he had been convicted of this same offense more
than 200 times. The state court held that imposition of the sentence
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though de-
fendant was allegedly an alcoholic.' A petition for habeas corpus was
denied in federal district court even though Driver was found to be a
chronic alcoholic.2 From this denial, defendant appealed. Held:
Reversed. The public appearance of a chronic alcoholic while in-
toxicated is a compulsive act symptomatic of the disease of chronic
alcoholism, and to criminally punish one for such conduct is cruel and
unusual punishment. Driver v. Hinnant, 856 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
A general rule of the common law, and one usually followed under
11393 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1966).
12 Id. at 495.
1 State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
"Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
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statute, is that voluntary drunkenness is no defense to a crime. Even
though one becomes drunk from an uncontrollable desire caused by
long indulgence in alcohol, not amounting to insanity, the courts have
generally regarded this as self-inflicted and therefore no defense. In-
voluntary intoxication, such as that induced by fraud or duress of
another party, constitutes a valid defense.3
The court here affirms the proposition that voluntary drunkenness
is no excuse for crime but concludes that the person who has indis-
putably been proven a chronic alcoholic does not drink voluntarily.
By rejecting the contention that the drinking was originally voluntary
and one must suffer the consequences, this decision represents a
significant point of departure from existing law. Thus the defense of
involuntary intoxication, previously limited to situations where the in-
toxicated state was produced by another party, may now be used
where one suffers from an uncontrollable, internal desire for alcohol.
Although the Driver decision represents a change in existing law,
emphasis must be placed on the court's limitation of its decision, first,
to a particular class of offender, and second, to the types of behavior
of that class exempt from criminal prosecution. Referring to the class
brought within the scope of the decision, the court said: "It is known
that alcohol can be addicting, and it is the addict-the involuntary
drinker-on whom our decision is now made. Hence we exclude the
merely excessive-steady or spree-voluntary drinker."4 Since Driver
had been proved to be an involuntary drinker, the first requirement
was met. Regarding the exempt types of behavior, the court stated:
"However, our excusal of the chronic alcoholic from criminal pro-
secution is confined exclusively to those acts on his part which are
compulsive as symptomatic of the disease." 5 Violation of the public
drunkenness statute was categorized by the court as a compulsive
symptom of chronic alcoholism, and thus Driver's behavior is of that
type which the court has chosen to exempt. Such conduct should not
be punished because the function of the criminal law is not to punish
those acts over which a party has no control.
Excusing the chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution for public
drunkenness rests on extra-legal as well as legal authority. The extra-
legal authority comes from the medical profession, which unanimously
agrees that alcoholism is an illness.6 Medical experts have also rec-
ognized that chronic alcoholism is a symptom of mental illness or
322 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 66-70 (1961).
4 356 F.2d 761, 764.
5 Ibid.




personality disorder.7 Previously, the judiciary generally has not ap-
proached the problem of alcoholism with understanding born of re-
cent scientific knowledge and experience. In Driver, however, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used extra-legal material to support
its decision and readily accepted medical authority in the absence of
legal precedent.8
The only significant legal authority relied on in Driver is Robinson
v. California.9 In reversing a conviction for being addicted to the use
of narcotics, the Supreme Court stated in that case:
We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a
criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0
The Supreme Court rationalized its decision on the fact that drug
addiction is a disease, not a crime. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals used a similar analysis in ruling that chronic alcoholism, noted
in Robinson as closely related to narcotic addiction," is also a disease,
not a crime. However, the Driver decision must be considered a
moderate extension of the Robinson doctrine within the Fourth Cir-
cuit because Driver dealt with punishment of an involuntary symptom
of a status, public intoxication, whereas Robinson was concerned only
with punishment of a status, narcotic addition. Just as the Supreme
Court in Robinson did not hold punishment of the actual use or pos-
session of narcotics unconstitutional, the Driver court did not explicitly
rule on the extent to which the alcoholic could use or possess the sub-
stance his body craves prior to, or separate from, this public display.
Thus the need is increased for the Supreme Court to clarify its position
as originally established in Robinson.
Next, it is appropriate to examine the tool, cruel and unusual
punishment, by which these results were accomplished. Historically, the
judiciary has been reluctant to develop standards by which to
7 MacDonald, Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, 21 01o ST. L.J. 96, 98(1960). One study has found that 42.8 per cent of the alcoholics observed suffered
from well-defined diagnostic categories such as paranoid schizophrenia, manic-
depressive reactions, and other mental disorders. DIETHELm, ETIOLOGY OF
CnmoNic ALCHOLIs.M 20-38 (1955). Still others have found that continued ex-
cessive drinking may lead to serious alterations in the nervous system itself.
Gm, aNs, CrsoNic ALCHOLISM 16 (1953).
sIt is significant to note that the Kentucky Court has recognized that one
suffering from chronic alcoholism is actually suffering from a disease, and by
reason of this fact is ill. However, this decision did not concern itself with the
criminal responsibility of the chronic alcoholic. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 297
Ky. 148, 155, 179 S.W.2d 210, 214 (1944).
9 370 U.S. 660 (1962).10 Id. at 667.
11 Id. at 667 n. 8.
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determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. Originally, the
amendment related to the method of punishment, whether brutal or
torturous.12 In a 1910 case,13 the principle that the punishment must
be in proportion to the crime was firmly established. A second develop-
ment in the scope of the amendment is discernible in a 1958 case, 14
which recognized mental anxiety as a means of cruel and unusual
punishment. Then, in 1962, the Supreme Court recognized that punish-
ment of an illness fell within the scope of the eighth amendment.'-
The present decision follows the development initiated in 1962 of
prohibiting punishment of conduct thought not to be the proper sub-
ject of criminal sanctions. Thus has the meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment expanded as society's concepts of dignity and humanity
have changed.
This interpretation of the eighth amendment could have signi-
ficant future implications. Generally, constitutional limitations have
not restricted the power of the states to define crime. However, a
decision such as Driver could possibly form a basis for judicial in-
validation of criminal legislation considered to be inappropriate. If
such a liberalized construction of the eighth amendment is continued,
this amendment may assume a more eminent role in safeguarding per-
sonal liberties. This would be in accord with the present trend to
protect more fully personal liberties, as exemplified by recent Supreme
Court decisions regarding other portions of the Bill of Rights.
Although the court based its decision solely on the eighth amend-
ment, it is worthwhile to note the similarity between the test applied
by the Driver court and the insanity defense established in Durham
o. United States.'6 There the court held that one is not criminally
responsible where the unlawful act is the product of mental disease
or defect.17 In Driver, the court held that one is not criminally respon-
12 To the framers the amendment was adopted as an "admonition to all
departments of the national government, to warn them against such violent
proceedings as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the
Stuarts." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TBE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
624 (4th ed. 1873).
1 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
14 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
10214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
17 In Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963), Kentucky
established a new test of criminal responsibility. Under this rule one is excused
from the criminal sanction if he is unable to resist the impulse to violate the law,
provided such conduct is the result of mental disease. By regarding chronic
alcoholism as a mental disease, such conduct, i.e., public drunkenness, would not
subject the actor to criminal responsibility. However, the Model Penal Code
from which this test was adopted does not recognize intoxication as a mental
disease for purposes of criminal responsibility. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (3)
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
[Vol. 55,
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sible when the unlawful act results compulsively from the disease of
chronic alcoholism. Thus in both cases, the unlawful conduct has
resulted involuntarily from an involuntary status and as such escapes
criminal punishment. Despite this similarity, it must be emphasized
that the Driver court did not accept chronic alcoholism as a mental
illness for purposes of criminal responsibility, nor has any court of
significance. However, since many medical authorities regard alcoho-
lism as a mental disease, the argument can be made that the insanity
plea should be acceptable in the case of the chronic alcoholic. But
until such an argument gains legal acceptance, the eighth amendment
as expounded in Driver remains the sole defense resting on pre-
cedent which is available to the chronic alcoholic.
Although representing a sound decision in light of the facts of the
case, Driver also creates several problems in regard to future ap-
plication of its doctrine. No guidelines were set up as to when the
use of alcohol becomes the disease of chronic addiction.' 8 To avoid
difficulty in distinguishing between the compulsive and volitional
user, cooperation of the judiciary and the medical profession is
essential.' 9 A second problem pertains to the extent of immunity
granted the chronic alcoholic for his unlawful acts. Although the court
exempts conduct restilting compulsively from the disease, the question
remains as to what conduct can be legally considered a compulsive
symptom. The theft of liquor might be a compulsive act of the chronic
alcoholic, but would it be exempt? Thirdly, intoxicated persons may
be taken into custody for inquiry or prosecution. Only when the ac-
cused's helplessness comes to light may he not be criminally pro-
secuted. Thus, if this decision is to have any practical effect, the fact
that alcoholism is a disease must be accepted by those who control
the initial stages of the legal process.
The significance of this decision lies in the fact that a new ap-
proach is applied to the age-old problem of chronic alcoholism and its
punishment under the criminal law. "Traditionally, we have tried to
meet the problem of alcoholism by penal law. But there is probably
no drearier example of the futility of using penal sanctions to solve a
psychiatric problem than the laws against drunkenness." 20 Perhaps
18 However, it would seem that a long period of excessive drinking with
recognizable syndromes would at least present a degree of objective evidence as to
when the use had become actual addiction. Those who might otherwise be
deterred by threat of the criminal sanction must be excluded from the reach of
this decision.
19 In the medical area, present facilities are insufficient and inadequate.
Turning chronic alcoholics into our crowded mental hospitals would create further
problems. Many in the profession might not wish to give any of their limited faci-
lities to cases which they are not in a position to treat.2 0 GurmAclHER & WEIHOFEN, PsycsnAmY & Tiir LAW 319 (1952).
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the Driver case best illustrates the truth of this statement. The number
of times Driver was convicted indicates the futility of his prison
terms. Neither deterred nor rehabilitated, he and others like him are
daily released again into society. In attempting to solve this problem,
the Driver court upholds civil commitment while refusing to allow
criminal conviction. Given the fact that the criminal law should not
punish an illness and that the chronic alcoholic is ill, the court's
reasoning becomes persuasive. Although problems are necessarily as-
sociated with this type of decision, Driver represents a more realistic
approach to this ancient problem of the criminal law21 and manifests
potential uses of the eighth amendment in other areas.
Charles R. Simons
ConPoRATioN - STocrIoLDE 's DERVATV S S - VEMFICATION RE-
QUIREMENT OF FEDERAL RuLE 23(b).-Plaintiff shareholder, a Polish
immigrant with a limited knowledge of English, received from the
management an offer to purchase her stock. Not understanding the
import of the offer, she sought the advice of her son-in-law, an invest-
ment counselor who had originally procured the stock for her. The son-
in-law immediately had misgivings about the offer, and he under-
took a comprehensive investigation of the management's operations.
He concluded that the directors were engaged in an illegal scheme to
defraud the corporation of millions of dollars and decided that the
best course for the plaintiff to follow would be to bring a derivative
suit. This she did, following the instructions of her son-in-law and an
attorney who had been hired by him. She made the affirmations in
the complaint required by Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules' and
verified the complaint pursuant to the same rule. A deposition of the
plaintiff taken by the defendants revealed that she was totally ignorant
21 The influence of the Driver case is already being felt. See Easter v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 196).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) "Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action
brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an
association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to en-
force rights which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified
by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the
transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court
of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise
have jurisdiction. The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts
of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if neces-
sary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his
failure to obtain action or the reasons for not making such effort."
[Vol. 55,
